U.S. Agricultural Secretary
spoke about "fairness to farmers" in a recent speech at the National Press Club. He raised concerns about the effects of the increased concentration among suppliers and their marketing tactics. "The ability of farmers to compete on a level playing field with adequate choices available to them and without undue influence or impediments to fair competition must be preserved," he said. Defining what is "fair" is at the heart of the genetically modified seed question.
The firms that supply genetically modified seed, herbicides, and related inputs to farmers are using strategies new to the industry (Moschini & Lapan, 1997) . Intellectual property rights, patent protection, vertical coordination, brand management, product bundling, extensive levels of research and development, and large capital flows have become important drivers of their strategic behavior. Risks for these supply firms are great because product life cycles are highly variable and most innovations never make it into the marketplace.
There are two sources of concern between biotechnology supply firms and agricultural producers. First, innovations such as genetically modified seeds command a price premium in the marketplace. This fact conflicts with a funda-mental belief of agriculture and neoclassical economics: the justness of marginal cost pricing and competitive markets. Second, faced with large investments and greater risks, biotechnology supply firms try to mitigate the risks through more extensive supply chain control by means of vertical integration, licensing, restrictive contracts, technology fees, and bundling.
The resulting dilemma in policy is the essence of this article. Which is more just, a competitive seed input market with competitive prices and a wide product distribution or a monopolistically competitive market with price premiums and more limited product distribution?
THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION
In economics, fairness is measured in terms of economic efficiency, the allocation of the benefits from an exchange. These benefits are comprised of three types: (a) consumer surplus, benefits to the purchaser of the product, (b) producer surplus, benefits to the seller of the product, and (c) dead weight loss, value that accrues to neither. The neoclassical model with a competitive market and economic efficiency divides the total surplus or benefits evenly between suppliers and consumers, with no dead weight loss. This model is consistent with the traditional agricultural model of efficient commodity marketing and input supply. It is not consistent with a world with rapid innovation.
Economists have identified a paradoxical situation (McNulty, 1968) . If all excess is rung out of the system, as some theoreticians believe occurs in a competitive market, why would any firm enter into the market in the first place? Assuming a rapidly equilibrating process, prices would be driven down to marginal cost and profits would be rung out of the market. Zero profits paint a fairly bleak future, and agricultural producers certainly can attest to the frustration of producing in a competitive market.
The incongruity between the outcome of a competitive market and the act of being competitive is a second component to the paradox of a competitive market (McNulty, 1968) . Other than those few sectors, like commodity agriculture, that are fully competitive, most sectors involve firms that employ the behavior of rivalry in order to survive; the economic term is monopolistic competition (Knight, 1946 , cited in McNulty, 1968 . Firms differentiate themselves and are afforded the luxury of setting prices above marginal cost (Schumpeter, 1936) . This price wedge, the rents from innovation, is necessary to provide the incentive for firms to innovate. As long as firms keep innovating and thereby differentiating their product, they will have some degree of market power, and prices can be above marginal cost. Schumpeter felt that those markets where price equals marginal costs reflected stagnant or unchanging markets, such as commodity markets. Whenever innovation occurs a premium will be paid. Individuals and firms are motivated by the hopes of capturing innovation rents, resulting in a constant activity of reorganizing and innovation.
Agriculture is now driven by technology innovation. Premiums, prices above marginal cost, have become critical incentives for biotechnology investment and risk taking. Noncompetitive prices and innovation go hand-in-hand and will therefore become the norm, not the exception, in agriculture. Significantly, agricultural biotechnology renders obsolete the belief system and models dependent on equilibrium and competitive markets in agriculture.
If noncompetitive prices and market power arising from innovation are to become the norm, what are the legal implications? Many firms and industries have economic power and can change prices sufficiently to earn economic rents, that is, returns larger than necessary to cover all their costs including normal profits. This practice is legal and encouraged by the granting of patents or copyrights (see Kesan, 2000) . In extreme monopoly situations, such as gas, water, and electric utilities, governments can regulate the prices charged by these firms. The Sherman Anti-Trust Act allows the federal government to prosecute firms exercising monopoly power in an unfair or predatory manner (see Ward, 2000 [WHICH REF?]), as was recently done with Microsoft (Carlton & Perloff, 1990 ):
The anti-trust laws are the major policy vehicle that the United States government uses to influence the ways in which firms compete with each other. The anti-trust laws do not make monopoly illegal. They do control how firms can attain and maintain their market positions . . . . [They] deal extensively with situations involving market power and try and control the creation and maintenance of market power. (pp. 730, 737) What about those firms that earn super-normal rents from their innovations? If a firm innovates and creates a new market where there is no competition, or out-competes its competitors so that there is no competition (as Microsoft argued), does anti-trust law pertain? The key test is predatory or exclusionary behavior. Simply charging high prices is not sufficient.
If the monopolist uses its power to proliferate its market power and prevent competition, then it is subject to anti-trust laws. Common Law, though, allows for monopoly pricing. Some forms of monopoly pricing, such as discriminatory pricing, are so common as to be accepted. Airlines price discriminate by charging the business consumer, who is time constrained, a much higher price. Telephone companies price discriminate by charging more for a call during business hours even though the marginal cost for placing a call is the same, day or night.
To understand innovation economics better, a simple model is useful. Suppose there are homogeneous firms each producing the same good. None has differentiated its product or innovated so they all use the same production technology and have the same marginal costs. The heterogeneous consumers are willing to pay different prices for the good. The competitive price, the "just" price in the neoclassical sense, is the marginal cost. This price is allocatively efficient, thus just, because all consumers willing to pay at least the marginal cost could purchase the product. At this price the quantity of sales and the number of consumers is maximized. Suppliers are content to sell at this price because their incremental costs are being covered. Individual supplying firms cannot effect the price, and under these circumstances excessive profits are competed away as higher prices attract greater supply. Most markets do not operate this way, however. They are not static because somebody is going to innovate.
Assume that a new, innovating firm does come along and produces the same good at a lower cost. Nobody else has the technology. Patents afford this new firm the legal right to its market position, which allows the firm market power to set price or quantity, to some degree. The innovator is not a pure monopolist because its behavior is bounded. It cannot set a monopoly price 1 because customers would quickly seek out the old firms as soon as the new firm's prices exceeded theirs. Thus, there is a ceiling on the price determined by the cost function of the firm's competitors. The innovating firm, seeking to maximize profits, sets a price just below the original price, captures all of the sales, and earns Schumpeterian rents. 2 This outcome is productively efficient because the best technology got to the marketplace.
In making assessments about societal welfare, this outcome of innovation is a source of conflict. Justice in an allocative sense gets the most products to the most people at the lowest price. Justice in a productivity sense gets the most output from society as a whole. The optimal welfare state lies somewhere between the two, where adequate Schumpeterian rents provide incentives for risk taking without allowing for predatory monopolies. The empirical section of the article shows where the agricultural biotechnology input sector lies on this continuum.
THE ECONOMICS OF TRANSACTION GOVERNANCE
Innovating biotechnology supply firms will have greater amounts of market power. Transaction theory provides some insight into the new governance structures such as vertical integration, licensing, contracts, and bundling that such firms employ. Transaction theory, developed by Coase (1937 Coase ( /1952 Coase ( , 1991 , is the study of the most microanalytical activities in the economy, the exchange process or "transaction" between two bilateral trading partners (Williamson, 1985) . At the heart of this theory is a continuum of governance choices (Adams & Goldsmith, 1999) . At one end of the continuum is the spot market, and at the other is vertical integration. The transaction occurs between two agents without a contract, in spot markets and the property right transfer is complete. Accordingly, there is no postexchange control by the seller over ownership and use of the input.
3 With vertical integration, the transaction is no longer a bilateral exchange between unaligned agents. The supply firm owns both sides of the transaction, and it becomes internalized.
In between these two governance extremes is quasi-integration, where control is more limited and a contract is used to govern the transaction. There are numerous types of quasi-integration governance structures from simple short-term contracts and licenses, giving the supplier various degrees of control, to joint ventures where control is equally shared (Goldsmith & Sporleder, 1998) .
The governance choice decision is a tradeoff problem (Goldsmith, 1995) that the biotechnology supply firm solves. There are great benefits of employing the spot market to sell or source one's goods and services. In the spot market, firms can do what they do best, specialize, and go to the marketplace for all other needs. On the other hand, there may be economies of scope where a firm can produce a much better product (e.g., genetic material) if the firm coordinates directly with a downstream firm, such as a seed company. A benefit of this relationship is that the downstream firm's interests are now aligned with those of the innovating firm. Licensing and short-term contracts by biotechnology firms (Monsanto) with seed marketing firms (Pioneer) afford some control and incentive alignment, whereas vertical integration assures complete control. By internalizing the transaction through vertical integration, routines develop and production efficiency results (Ouchi, 1980) .
In the spot market, there is no control of one firm over another and many firms exist, each being a specialist. In the more integrated market, firm numbers are reduced, firm size increases, and coordination efficiencies result. There is a tradeoff because in a dynamic world these large bureaucratic firms are slow to adapt and can be myopic (Williamson, 1985) . Coase (1937 Coase ( /1952 states, Why, if by organizing [into a unified governance structure] one can eliminate certain costs and in fact reduce the cost of production, are there any [spot] market transactions at all? . . . First, as a firm gets larger, there are decreasing returns to the entrepreneurial function, that is the costs of organizing additional transactions within the firm may rise . . . . Secondly, it may be that as the transactions which are organized increase, the entrepreneur fails to make best uses where their value is greatest, that is, fails to make the best uses of the factors of production. (p. 340) The biotechnology supplier must solve this calculus, obtaining the necessary control versus creating a myopic, lethargic bureaucracy. The need for control is a function of risk and reward. Because investments are made by the technology firm, long before a product's success is indicated (ex-ante), and sales occur long after investments have been made (ex-post), a poor mapping of the two can result in undercompensation for the firm (Caves, 1990) . Firms have a strong incentive to ensure that products are marketed effectively.
Another source of risk is that a product may be mishandled down the supply chain. This failure could dampen overall demand for the product, causing inadequate returns to the upstream firm. This mishandling can occur by intermediaries who transform the product or by the end-consumer who might not have the proper training to employ the product properly.
Three strong forces lead to greater supply chain control in agricultural biotechnology. First, the full value of genetic material becomes apparent after combining the knowledge of the genomics with the plant breeding and marketing knowledge of the seed companies. Their "package" then conveys real value to producers who buy the product. If the technology firms were to own the seed company (vertical integration), then the full value of the innovation would flow back to the life sciences firm, where the greatest risk and investment took place.
Second, biotechnology supply firms are concerned about how their product (e.g., Bt corn and RR ® soybeans) is handled throughout the marketing chain, especially by the end-user (farmer). Control allows the supply firm to optimize the technology system for the greatest and most secure set of returns. For example, Monsanto's seed warranty is only valid if Monsanto's glyphosate, Roundup ® , is used. The argument is that the seed has been specially designed for, and its performance depends on, the use of Monsanto's own brand of glyphosate. If an inferior complementary product, say imported glyphosate, were used, the seed might perform less well. The seed's poor performance resulting from this mishandling would adversely affect the brand name of the biotechnology supplier.
Third, a property known as asset specificity also drives greater integration. Asset specificity is a measure of the change in value of an asset if it cannot be employed in its best application (Goldsmith & Sporleder, 1998; Williamson, 1985) . An asset whose value falls dramatically is said to be highly specific, whereas one that falls little would be fungible and pose little transaction risk (ceteris paribus). If the innovating firm cannot bring its seed to market successfully, it suffers losses because other uses for the underlying assets are much less desirable. The huge investment and specific nature of agricultural biotechnological investment creates high levels of risk and necessitates supply chain control. Biotechnology investments are made ex-ante, so capital must be sourced ex-ante. If risks are high or expected 4 returns are too low, investors will not risk their capital. They will invest in alternatives where the risk-return profile is more favorable.
If agricultural input supply markets become populated by such technologies, governance structures affording control are to be the norm in order to manage the return, product handling, and asset specificity risks. Spot markets will become less frequent, and integrated markets will dominate.
SEED INDUSTRY CONCENTRATION AND FARMER WELFARE
The agricultural biotechnology supply industry produces products ranging from pharmaceuticals to foodstuffs. It is a multi-billion dollar, capital intense, and risk-filled industry. When it entered the commercial phase in the 1980s, firms sought ways to capture rents (profits) from their innovations in new products. They adopted various interfirm agreements and upstream and downstream vertical control strategies (Hayenga, 1998; Heffernan, 1999; Kalaitzandonakes, 1999; Kalaitzandonakes & Bjornson, 1997) .
These institutional adaptations ensured their property rights on plants and products (Kalaitzandonakes, 1999) . Mergers, acquisitions, and cluster formations have increased their market share and ensure a level of control over the seed, chemical, and biotechnology industries (Goldsmith & Henn, 1999) . From 1981 to 1996, a total of more than 1,500 mergers, acquisitions, licenses, and other interfirm activities occurred, and they are expected to continue until only a few firms control the market (Kalaitzandonakes & Bjornson, 1997) . According to Shimoda (1999) , only three or four global agricultural biotechnology seed/agricultural chemical complexes may remain in the industry.
Traditionally, there have been distinct lines between the seed, agrochemical, and biotechnology industries, but today this line is barely distinguishable (Rural Advancement Foundation International [RAFI], 1998). RAFI, an organization very skeptical of the benefits of biotechnology, describes the changing structure as the result of the combination of high research investment and the production of a living, reproducible product. Companies are forced to adopt new strategies, including producer contracts and licensing, that radically alter the relationship between the technology firm (a licensor such as Monsanto) and the traditional seed companies (a licensee such as Pioneer). Vertical integration has been used, whereby a firm takes possession of an additional stage in the marketing chain, such as moving from research and development (Monsanto) to marketing (DeKalb Seed). To achieve economies of scale and marketing control for a proper return on investment, mergers of two firms or business units operating in the same marketing stage (i.e., Novartis Crop Protection with the agrochemicals business of AstraZeneca) are valuable. The effect is a global seed trade dominated by the so-called "life industry," whose goal is to capture the profits from biotechnology innovation and chemical technology (RAFI, 1998) .
On a worldwide basis, the seed industry does not exhibit a high level of concentration. In 1997, the top 10 companies accounted for about 30% of the global market (see Table 1 ). Compared to other agricultural sectors, this market is still fragmented (Lebuanec, 1998) . The C-4 ratio, the sum of the market shares of the top four firms in a market, was 21%. As a rule of thumb, depending on the market, the product, and other issues, anti-trust questions generally are raised when the C-4 exceeds 60%. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is a second metric of concentration. It is the sum of squares of the market share of each firm in the market, the maximum being 10,000 (100 2 ). For the seed industry, the HHI is 1308 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 351 5 (see Table 1 ), but the U.S. Department of Justice will not investigate a merger if the HHI is less than 1,000, according to its guidelines (Department of Justice, 2000a Justice, , 2000b . 6 Nationally, more concentration exists. In the United States in 1980, the four largest corn seed companies held 57% of the market. By 1997, the C-4 ratio had risen to 69% and the HHI reached 2,138. 7 With the recent extensive merger and acquisition activity, the Dupont-Pioneer and Monsanto-DeKalb-Holden complexes now influence nearly 90% of the corn market (Hayenga, 1998) .
The soybean seed market is less concentrated, as Pioneer and Monsanto each only have 19% of the market (see Table 1 ). The C-4 ratio is 47% and the HHI is 996. 8 Public seed varieties influence a significant amount of the market (10%), as do numerous other small firms. The lower concentration could be due to the traditionally lower profitability of this market, as 25% of the soybean seed was farmer-saved, in 1997, and not purchased at that time (Hayenga, 1998) .
The cotton seed market is the most concentrated. Monsanto, after its association with Delta & Pine Land and acquisition of Stoneville, dominated the market with an 84% share (Hayenga, 1998 ) (see Table 1 ). The C-4 ratio was 90%, and the HHI was 7,088. 9 Due to public concerns about the monopolistic characteristics of this market, and the subsequent investigation by the Justice Department, Monsanto decided to sell Stoneville (Howie, 1999) , restoring some competitiveness to the industry. That sale and the recent termination of the Monsanto-Delta Pine Land deal reduced the C-4 to 88% and the HHI to 5,360.
INDUSTRY COMPETITION AND FARMER WELFARE
Although concentration is evident, other institutions beside the Department of Justice help make firms act more competitively. Agriculture cooperatives have long served as a competitive yardstick (Nourse, 1922) . In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, agricultural producers were faced with some very difficult challenges (Mullinix, 1982) . Specialized input products might not have been available because of the smallness or dispersion of the market. When products were available, the number of suppliers might have been inadequate for good market discipline. Supplier market power could enable an economic "hold-up" 10 (Tirole, 1992) , adversely affecting the welfare of producers. The individual producer needed institutional mechanisms, such as cooperatives, to countervail opportunism and the holdup situation encountered when markets fail (Cook, 1995) . Thin markets (i.e., few sellers) were the norm and supplier market power was common. Group action, for example aggregating supply through cooperatives, was a natural outcome that made suppliers act more competitively.
Much has changed, but farmers still face thin upstream markets. For the modern farmer, the threat from thin markets results from suppliers' innovations, not from being dispersed. Innovation by input supply firms has created market positions for which there can be little competition. The time lag is long for new supply entrants to enter the market due to barriers arising from replicating research and development complexes. Hence, the specter of upstream market power has arisen again, allowing for a new role for group action in agriculture. A healthy supply-cooperative sector accounts for a significant proportion of agricultural input supply sales (see Table 2 ). The existence of large input supply cooperatives such as Cenex Harvest States, Land O' Lakes, and Growmark, to name a few, may force technology firms to act responsibly lest the co-ops integrate upstream and compete directly by acquisitions on their own or even investing in research and development.
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GM SEED PRICES AND PRODUCER WELFARE
In evaluating the impacts of pricing policies, the demand elasticity (price responsiveness) for agricultural inputs, generally, and seeds and herbicides, specifically, is an important factor. If the genetically modified inputs are not very different from the conventional ones and if farmers have alternatives, biotech seed suppliers will not have significant market power and farmers will easily switch if prices are too high or contract terms are too burdensome. Demand would be elastic. How elastic is the demand for genetically modified seeds?
Research has shown that the elasticity for pesticides as a class of inputs is inelastic, that is, if the price goes up by one percent, usage falls by less than one percent (Lin, Taylor, Delvo, & Bull, 1995) . The demand for individual ingredients is elastic, however (Lin et al., 1995) . For example, the demand for organophosphate and organochlorine insecticides tended to fall when their prices increased, whereas those of other insecticides did not, reflecting the availability and use of alternatives (Carlson, 1977 , cited in Lin et al., 1995 . The demand elasticity for genetically modified seeds appears significant. As of early 2000, producers were still weighing the risks of producing genetically modified crops in the year 2000. Their ability to wait and their ability to make a choice indicates that demand is elastic.
Alexander and Goodhue (1999) compared farmers' net revenue, excluding seed cost, from 20 different corn hybrids. Their purpose was to measure the ability of genetically modified seed suppliers to exercise market power. No net revenue advantage existed for varieties containing the Liberty Link ® gene compared 1310 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST Cook, 1995. to certain traditional high yielding hybrids-any net revenue advantage was nonexistent, denying any real market power. Risk adjusted average net revenue figures 12 can be calculated from the Alexander and Goodhue data (see Table 3 ). Averaging the yields within each seed type identifies the markup on seed that a company could theoretically charge while denying the farmer an incentive to switch. A firm offering a Bt seed product could charge slightly less than $6.07 more per acre for its seed, and Liberty Link ® seed could be sold for a premium slightly less than $12.39. Nelson et al. (1999) In summary, due to the availability of substitutes, demand appears to be moderately elastic. Suppliers of the new technology are constrained from exercising monopoly power and charging monopoly prices. Prices are above the competitive price, but nevertheless many farmers are adopting the new technology. Apparently, biotechnology supply firm market power is not adversely affecting the welfare of producers. The presence of biotechnology inputs has changed the marketing arrangements used in the industry, though. These arrangements have been questioned for reducing farmer welfare, and therefore they need to be analyzed-the subject of the next section.
SEED MARKETING PRACTICES AND FARMER WELFARE
A producer who had been producing corn and soybeans in the Midwest for the past 30 years would harvest a crop every October and immediately start thinking about next year's production plan. Local seed representatives, sensing that the corn was in the bin, would begin the late fall, early winter ritual of direct seed and pesticide sales. Producers would comparison shop, exchange anecdotes, and reach as informed a decision as possible. They would negotiate terms and place orders for delivery the following March or April. Farm shows attest to an active and relatively competitive market.
In 1996, everything changed. Suppliers maintained control of certain property through licensing and ownership strategies. The more extensive the control mechanism, the more restrictive the allocation of property rights. Previously, marketing stages were distinct, and the product moved discreetly through the supply chain. Now the stages were joined, and control shifted upstream. The new governance structures used by biotechnology supply firms include the following: (a) royalty-bearing licensing (e.g., Bt technology from Mycogen to Ciba), (b) (Renkoski, 1998) .
Biotechnology supply companies are using licensing agreements to coordinate their value chain with seed marketing firms to reach the market more effectively. They own the gene but license its use to certain seed companies, which in turn sell a seed product. DowElanco, LLC, and Garst Seed Co. (Feedstuffs, 1998) and Monsanto and Dow AgroSciences, LLC (Howie, 1999) , have employed a license agreement. Alternatively, vertical integration, the complete control of the transaction by the upstream firm, occurred in the cases of Monsanto and DeKalb and Monsanto and Delta Pine Land (Hayenga, 1998) . Integrating further downstream into crop production has not occurred as Monsanto and Dupont appear to have no interest at this point in controlling the use of land and producing agricultural commodities.
The third case more directly affects farmers because they have to pay seed premiums and technology fees and enter into a contractual relationship with the innovating firm. Monsanto, for example, uses restrictive contracts, called "grower agreements," whose terms and conditions must be accepted to use the technology. The growers receive the right to purchase the technology but are not permitted to keep seed, sell it, or give it away for replanting purposes (Monsanto, 1998) . 13 The seed companies that license the product (e.g., Garst) are in charge of collecting these fees for Monsanto, while receiving a small handling fee (Hayenga, 1998) . Monsanto (1998) said this technology fee represents the value of the gene technology delivered via seed. They also say that the money collected helps fund new research and development, increases the supply of the seed, and pays for educational programs, crop insurance, and activities focused on the global acceptance of the technology. This fee varies between crops and traits (e.g., $6.50/bag of RR ® soybeans) (Farmsource.com, 1999) . Some companies such as AgrEvo decided not to use grower contracts and sell seed through distribution channels without restrictions and fees (Meister, 1999, personal communication) , but Monsanto (1998) argued that those companies are including the cost of the technology in the seed. In any case, as more competitors develop substitute technologies, the technology fees and contracts probably will disappear (Hayenga, 1998) . Thus, these marketing tools may only reflect the market power associated with these products' current uniqueness in the marketplace.
Another example of control relates specifically to Bt (insect resistant) corn. If producers neglect to plant a refuge around the fields planted with genetically modified seed, natural resistance may arise rendering the Bt seed product obsolete (see Westervelt, 2001 [this issue]). Thus, producers, through misuse of the product, can have a significant detrimental effect on the market power of the innovator. To prevent this, firms such as Monsanto use a contract. When growers sign the agreement for YieldGard ® , which contains Bt technology, they agree to establish a refuge adjacent to the crop (Monsanto, 1998 ).
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MONOPOLY PRICING AND FARMER WELFARE
Technology fees are a new marketing innovation. The pricing of crop inputs can be broken down into three components, the technology fee, the seed price, and the herbicide price. For example, Monsanto has charged a $15/acre technology fee, priced the herbicide low at $5/acre for Roundup ® , and charged a separate price for seed (Marra, Carlson, & Hubbell, 1997) . Alternatively, Ciba sells a voucher for the right to purchase 12 bags of seed at $99/bag ($3-$5 higher per bag). Mycogen has a value pack of 48 bags with a 10% to 15% premium. AgrEvo (Liberty) charges no technology fee, but charges a premium for the seed/herbicide bundle (AgrEvo, 1999) . The pricing variations shown above demonstrate how a firm with market power has control over its marketing strategy. Hence, a choice for using a technology fee is also a choice not to use some other pricing strategy.
To understand the input supplier's pricing strategy, assume the firm faces large volume demanders (large farmers) and small volume demanders (small farmers).
15 Its product is a bundle of seed and herbicide. The firm must decide on an optimum price, called a uniform price. The large producers (inelastic demanders) are willing to pay more than smaller producers (elastic demanders) because there are scale economies in agriculture and the costs of production are lower for larger producers. They would have a higher willingness to pay for these bundled inputs, and at higher input prices they could still earn a profit. The supplying biotech firm faces a dilemma when it insists on there being no resale of the product, individuals are purchasing the product, and individuals are signing the grower agreement. This system works well if demand of those individuals is homogeneous, but demand is heterogeneous in agriculture, and a relatively high price would reduce small farmer purchases and a relatively low price would give excess surplus to large producers and not maximize the monopolist's profits.
If the firm is forced to have only one price under such conditions, the firm will choose a higher price. Because the larger firm demand is more inelastic, the higher price does not overly reduce their purchases. Smaller farmers may be priced out of the market, but their demand is small so supplier revenue is relatively less affected. When a firm faces heterogeneous demand, a firm with some market power prices for the inelastic (larger) farmers and sacrifices the sales of the marginal producer. When uniform pricing strategy is used and demand is heterogeneous (like in agriculture), there can be regressive welfare impacts on producers as smaller or less efficient producers may be priced out of the market.
Nonlinear pricing allows an input supplier to offer more than one price and segment the market better. A firm could establish a fixed fee and then equate the per unit price as close to marginal cost as possible, a strategy called a two-part tariff, so that the largest demanders will have an incentive to consume (Oi, 1971; Tirole, 1992) . Thus, if the marginal cost to supply an input were zero, firms would have an incentive to buy.
In the seminal manuscript on such two-part tariffs, Walter Oi (1971) outlined what he termed the "Mickey Mouse Monopoly." He formalized the monopoly practice of charging a large entry fee to enter an amusement park and pricing the services at marginal cost. In his stylized model, he was describing the marketing of Disneyland: "If you were the owner of Disneyland, should you charge high lump sum admission fees and give the rides away, or should you let people into the amusement park for nothing and stick them with high monopolistic prices for the rides?" (p. 77). Although the marginal cost to enjoy a ride is almost zero at Disney, a discriminatory entry fee attempts to extract the consumer surplus of the inelastic consumers, tourists that make up a high percentage of the customer base.
16 This strategy could be applied to the genetically modified seed market. Large farmers can get greater value from the new technology and thus are willing to pay a fee.
Seed suppliers have not used a fixed fee similar to the Disney case. Using Monsanto's arrangement as an example, the technology fee is charged on a per acre basis. Thus, the strategy is quite comparable, say, to Liberty® in that total producer cost per unit is unchanged with the quantity purchased. This per unit pricing strategy avoids inducing producers to resell the product through a cooperative, thus voiding the impact of a high lump sum fee. Thus, the technology fee strategy used by the industry is really just a form of uniform monopoly pricing. Yet, the seed industry appears to meet all the requirements for use of nonlinear pricing. It has market power, it can prevent resale, and it can infer consumer's willingness to pay (Carlton & Perloff, 1990) . It already has multi-part pricing through its technology fee, seed price, and herbicide price. Therefore, its failure to implement nonlinear pricing suggests that its monopoly power is limited. Therefore, when making their value judgments and comparisons, farmers should pay attention to the full cost of the products and services being purchased, not to the stated rationale.
BUNDLING AND FARMER WELFARE
Another input supplier strategy is bundling, for example, tying the purchase of Roundup ® herbicide and RR ® seed. Carlton and Perloff (1990) use the term requirement tie-ins (p. 469), meaning that to get one product you must purchase a second product. Its economic impact can range all the way from efficiency enhancing (good) to competition reducing (bad). Adding to the complexity is that assessing bundling's effect involves understanding the reaction function of consumers as well as the production function of the bundling firm.
Assume two products are produced, one is a monopoly product and the second is a competitively produced product. Also assume there is interrelated demand, the price of one good will affect the demand for the bundled good. This would be the case with seed and herbicide where the monopolist maximizes profit subject to both prices. The value of the seed is directly related to its use with the herbicide. Each component in the bundle derives value from the paired product.
Bundling can be a valuable practice, thus efficiency enhancing, for consumers when the competitive good in the bundle reduces or eliminates the consumer's search cost. If the competitively produced product is fairly homogeneous and low cost, consumers will prefer the reduction in search time and effort over the option of choice. Antennas come with cars and consumers prefer that because the search cost far exceeds the value of the product (antenna). In this case, the bundling company is providing value through bundling. Whether the bundling firm is offering such convenience in the case of seed-herbicide is unclear.
From a production standpoint, producing the two goods together is often more efficient. There are scope efficiencies. For life science firms, the capital and technology used in producing genetically modified seed may also be useful in making complementary goods like herbicides. There may be technical specifications that when coordinated provide a better product or a more efficient production process. In the case of RR ® seed, a better herbicide resistant variety may be produced by a firm that produces the Roundup ® herbicide. There are industry structure implications as well. Firms that only produce the competitive product, as opposed to both, may face stiffer competition. The monopolist can leverage its power in one market to support its efforts in a second more competitive market, where price approaches marginal cost.
Another source of efficiency from bundling has to do with a monopoly product's performance. The bundling firm asserts that its product will perform less well and its brand harmed if the firm's own competitively produced good is not used. In this case, it would be a misnomer to call the bundled good "competitive" because the monopoly firm is asserting that its product is different enough to have a distinct impact on the performance of the bundled monopoly product. Whether Roundup ® herbicide is necessary to the performance of the RR® soybeans or whether an alternative glyphosate product will perform just as well remains unknown.
Anti-trust questions with bundling arise because a firm that holds a monopoly in one product uses its monopoly power to try to dominate a second market. The case of IBM (1936) NEED REF. involved the requirement that clients purchase IBM's tabulating cards if they were to use IBM's equipment (Carlton & Perloff, 1990; Tirole, 1992) . This precedent is relevant because seed suppliers are using requirement tie-ins to earn monopoly rents in a market they currently don't dominate (i.e., herbicides).
17 Bundling also ties a client more closely to the supplying firm. As the amount of products and services being delivered increases, the supplying firm has more opportunity to add special features, services, and options (Kahn & McAlister, 1997) .
This question is complicated by whether, after its glyphosate patent expires, Monsanto can differentiate the herbicide product enough to be able to support its policy of not upholding a seed warranty if an unapproved product is used. Currently, its contract (Monsanto, 1999) The Monsanto case has three additional aspects of importance that may make it a questionable bundle. First, the covenants on the herbicide tie-in are strict. There are recommended practices that must be followed or the warranties will be invalid. It is strategically important for the monopolist, through a contract, to define the herbicide application rate to eliminate substitution. Otherwise, as the price of the monopolized product (seed) increases and that of the competitive product (herbicide) decreases, rational agents may substitute the lower priced good for the higher priced good.
Second, because the demands are interrelated, market power can be used to adjust the relative price of the two products strategically. In the case of Roundup ® , as the patent expires and the world price for the herbicide falls toward marginal cost, rents can be shifted to the monopoly product, the seed, thus preserving some if not all of the value lost by the patent's expiration. In this way, Monsanto can extend the monopoly power from the herbicide to the seed.
Third, for tie-ins to work, there cannot be resale. Otherwise, consumers could unbundle the goods and arbitrage the price premium. With agricultural biotechnology such a practice could be fairly easily done, as shipping and perishability are minor cost factors. Thus, to protect against arbitrage, the supplier firms employ a strategy of strict contracts prohibiting resale and enforce the contracts (Weiss, 1999) .
DURABILITY AND FARMER WELFARE
The marketing of sterile seeds, or "terminator" technology, is one of the most controversial agricultural biotechnology marketing strategies. Biotechnology renders the seed from plants sterile, making it impossible for farmers to keep seed from the best plants to be replanted the following year. The firms supplying the seed argue that the seed is covered by their product patents and thus should not be used without their permission. Farmers are forced to purchase all of their seed each year (Feder, 1999): Seed sterility is just one part of a much broader area of research regarded as crucial by many biotechnology companies: the use of chemicals to turn particular genes on or off at specific times in the life of a plant, animal or human. . . . [It] could be an important tool for assuring that other genetically engineered traits like herbicide resistance do not escape into wild plants. (pp. 1, 3) In terms of the welfare of producers, it is important to understand why monopolists benefit from such technologies as plant sterility. Although the issue has been forestalled as Monsanto has withdrawn from using the terminator technology (Feder, 1999) , the underlying incentive for monopoly firms to engage in such practices remains.
From the perspective of farmer welfare and monopoly marketing, terminator technology demonstrates an age-old predicament for monopolists-durability. The durability question is one where the monopolist becomes its own worst enemy, producing a substitute good. The substitution occurs because the monopolist produces a good that endures over time, and the customer has no need to make a repeat purchase.
If a farmer were able, one time, to purchase the advanced technology of the genetically modified crop and then replant the subsequently produced seed, the monopolist's ability to extract rents or receive compensation for the investment would be greatly limited. Durability must be reduced as much as possible to promote repeat purchases and achieve a return commensurate with the ex-ante investment. Terminator technology does so perfectly.
The inability to control the durability of the product in theory could affect the rate of research and development for new product development. If a firm cannot achieve an appropriate rate of return from sales of the product either through legal (contract) or technological restraints (TT), then it would be forced to underinvest. Monsanto expressed this argument in a memo to the Illinois Farm Bureau in regard to its pricing policy in Argentina. It admitted that because property rights protection was lacking in Argentina, underinvestment is occurring, and farmers were receiving inappropriate seed varieties for their region. The firm did not have an incentive, through adequate property rights protection, to make the proper investment (Illinois Farm Bureau, 1998):
Because there is no reward for innovation [in Argentina] there is little incentive to develop new products. Consequently, Argentine farmers have access to only 30 Roundup ready soybean varieties, while American farmers will have over 1,000 varieties, with a broad range of defensive packages, to choose from in 1999. This becomes even more important when seed quality is considered. Such a low percentage of seed in Argentina meets minimum germination standards that growers routinely increase seeding rates by over 25% to compensate. (p. 1) To understand this durability issue better, consider the following example. Assume that the input supply firm has a choice to make its seed infinitely durable (i.e., after one purchased RR ® soybeans, all of the benefits of the genetically modified technology could be enjoyed year after year without repurchase). This would definitely thwart the monopoly power that the innovation awards to the firm. In the first year, the firm sets a monopoly price because it has a unique product. All those consumers willing to pay the high monopoly price do so. The rest stay out of the market. In the 2nd year, the supplier cannot make any additional sales at the monopoly price because all those who are willing to pay the monopoly price have already done so and never need to make a repeat purchase. The monopolist can only lower its price and attract some of those consumers who were priced out of the market in the first period. It would continually do so period after period until the price fell to marginal cost. The Coase Conjecture (Coase, 1972) posits that consumers (farmers) are rational and understand a monopolist's incentive to make additional sales in the future. So farmers wait believing that a monopolist has an incentive and will lower prices in the next period. In the limit, if the good is infinitely durable and producers are infinitely lived, they could wait until price falls to marginal cost. Therefore, durability is the bane of the monopolist and it is not coincidental that the life science industry has invoked two powerful tools, one legal and one technological, to reduce the durability of its product.
RENTING STRATEGIES 18 AND FARMER WELFARE
At issue is the monopolist's behavior with respect to property rights and its preference for allocating fewer rights (renting) than more rights (selling). By retaining many of the property rights over the usage and durability of the product, the firm is effectively renting the product to the user. Five strategy scenarios of a monopoly renting model help us to understand why input supply biotechnologies are being marketed with strict contract covenants.
The assumptions of the model are a product durability of two periods, meaning a seed that can be replanted for next year's crop, and a monopolist with the option to "rent" the product with extensive contracts or sell the product outright.
The Fortuitous Farmer scenario serves as a baseline. Here, the monopolist naively sells the seed at marginal cost. All farmers willing to at least pay a price equal to marginal cost will be able to enjoy the product. The dead weight loss, or allocative inefficiency, is zero. No seed is sold in the second period because farmers who purchased in the first period have no need for seeds-the seed can be replanted-leaving only farmers who are not willing to pay a price equal to marginal cost. This scenario is productively inefficient as well as unrealistic because the marginal cost price provides no incentive to innovate.
In the Myopic Farmer scenario, the monopolist employs a monopoly price, but farmers are myopic and believe that the current price is permanent. The firm will set a price equal to the point where it earns no additional return from an additional sale. Compared to the previous scenario, surplus is transferred from farmers to the supplier as the higher monopoly price prevails. Fewer farmers are willing to pay the higher price, so there is a dead weight loss because of those farmers priced out of the market. Due to this allocative inefficiency, society would be worse off.
If the monopolist would prefer not to remain idle in the second period, it could service those farmers who did not make purchases but are willing to pay a price greater than marginal cost. As explained in the previous section, the monopolist has an incentive to sell in the second period but now must lower its price. This second period price attracts those farmers who in the first period were willing to pay a price greater than marginal cost but less than the monopoly price. The monopolist earns additional monopoly rents in the second period, which is a lot better than the zero profits earned in the previous scenario. This scenario is also unrealistic because farmers are not myopic and will wait for the second period when prices fall (e.g., a sale).
The Coasean Farmer scenario assumes that a monopoly seller has an incentive to lower its price in the second period and customers know it (the Coase Conjecture). Instead of paying the full two-period monopoly price in the first period, the farmer is only willing to pay the implicit rental rates for periods 1 and 2, namely, half the 1st-year price plus one half of the lower 2nd-year price. But farmers know that in period 3 the monopolist does not want idle capacity, wants to add to its income, and will lower the price again, so farmers' willingness-to-pay falls again. This process continues until the price falls to marginal cost. The lesson of the Coase Conjecture is that if farmers know in the first period that the price will fall to marginal cost, they might try to free-ride by letting others buy early and waiting to capture a bargain later. This realization severely constrains the durable goods monopolist and produces an unrealistic outcome similar to the Fortuitous Farmer one.
A Determined Monopolist fixes its price in the first period and makes no sales in the second period. This outcome is unlikely given the nature of industrial production and fixed capacity. In short, imagining the monopolist willingly resigned to the perils of producing a durable seed is unrealistic.
The only realistic alternative for the monopolist is the Savvy Monopolist scenario. The monopolist changes the terms and conditions of the sale of its seed by restricting the property rights and essentially renting the services of the product, period by period. By forcing the consumer to return every year, the monopolist is able to extract monopoly rents and generate significant surpluses. Renting the services provides an alternative to technologically reducing the durability of the product and solves the capacity problem. The seed contracts stipulating no replanting of seed provide this outcome. Farmers use the services of the seed to generate a commodity crop, sell the crop, and return seeking new seed the following year.
Which price is most "fair," the rate charged by Savvy Monopolist or the marginal cost price found in the case of the Fortuitous Farmer? One is productively efficient, whereas the other is allocatively efficient. At issue is whether there would be research and development and new advanced technologies if the Savvy Monopolist were constrained.
One approach recommended by economists is to focus on market structure to ensure the fairest prices possible in the long run. The key issue is not whether a monopoly is formed but whether the monopoly is used to extend or expand market power. By renting seed, the Savvy Monopolist could be seen to be simply attempting to make a reasonable profit. Yet, this very strategy could be the Savvy Monopolist's undoing because it could provide an invitation for a new firm to provide the durability consumers demand. Therefore, by creating economic conditions with as few barriers to entry as possible, market discipline can be present and inefficiencies in product offerings can be avoided.
OTHER CONCERNS RAISED BY MONOPOLY RENTING
A rental contract can be designed, as the supplying seed firms claim, to protect their property rights or to extract rents from farmers. Not all firms with monopoly power insist on contracts that restrict property rights. One likely determinant of the need for property right restrictions is whether the good is easily imitated, that is replicable. In the case of genetically modified seed, the risk may not be from reverse engineering or the breeding of competitive lines but from the fact that additional rents can be captured by farmers by replanting the seed. Monsanto, for example, underinvests in regions of the world where intellectual property rights are not protected.
On the other hand, seeds with a likelihood of replanting have been sold without contracts for many years in countries with strong property rights protection. Genetically modified crops may be treated differently because the stakes are higher because of the greater investment and overall uncertainty 19 associated with genetically modified products.
The extent of postpurchase control by selling firms is another fairness question. The IBM punch card case entailed an obligation to purchase the punch cards once the punch card machine had been purchased. In the United Shoe, Inc. case, after-sales service had to be purchased from the manufacturer of the equipment. These cases were deemed in court to be noncompetitive and a restraint of trade. They erect barriers for additional firms who might want to enter the market, for example, offering punch cards or service. The tie-in keeps prices high and reduces the benefits that a more competitive market might deliver. The rental contracts for genetically modified seed greatly restrict the after-sale rights of the purchaser. These restrictions not only affect the users but also the ability for other input suppliers to compete.
Another fairness question is raised by renting when the supplying firm insists on maintaining control. This issue has arisen in the discussions related to the unintended consequences of genetically modified products, such as pollen drift, commingling with nongenetically modified varieties, pest immunity buildup, and long-term adverse environmental harm. Does the seed supplier, by using such restrictive contracts, retain liability for the product? Can the firm insist on control without accepting the responsibility?
CONCLUSION
At the root of structural change in the seed industry is the changing technology that underlies the competitive space. Biotechnology, at this early stage, involves long-jump types of innovations with high levels of investment, extensive risk taking, and relatively lengthy cycle times from investment to market. The character of the underlying technology has driven corporate strategy and industry structure. The seed industry continues to be in the throes of a very active mergers and acquisition stage as firms try to link capital, research and development, and marketing. These new life science conglomerates, in turn, conduct themselves differently than their predecessors do.
The earning of innovation rents by these firms raises the issue of society's preference for allocative or productive efficiency. Historically, agriculture has emphasized the importance of allocative efficiency and equality, but that may be incompatible with an industry driven by biotechnological innovation. If super-marginal cost pricing then is acceptable, the issue becomes, What is a fair return to innovation?
The final analysis as to the welfare impacts for producers is a political and legal question, as well as an economic one. In terms of the economics, the analysis of the welfare impacts comes down to a delicate balance between innovation and monopoly rents, elasticities of demand, and real market power possessed by the life science firms. Although there is evidence of industry concentration, firm market power appears muted. This discipline arises principally from the relatively elastic demand for genetically modified crop systems. Farmers not only have alternatives among genetically modified products, but there are unmodified substitutes available. The sector is extremely dynamic, and when end-consumer and environmental issues are factored in, seed firms face numerous challenges, risks, and uncertainties that impact their conduct.
There is little evidence of excessively high prices and the use of nonlinear pricing. Both would be evidence of significant market power. Alternatively though, the use of product bundling and product renting indicate that the market is far from competitive. The productive efficiency value of these practices is questionable as firms are insulated to some degree from vigorously trying to improve their products and services. With respect to bundling, if no real difference exists between glyphosate herbicides, then the herbicide market becomes distorted. On the other hand, a seed-herbicide bundle may be the best way technologically to produce crops.
The renting/durability question concerns the adequate control necessary for sufficient returns to flow back to the innovating firm. If seed did become more durable, as is the case in some international markets where seed can be legally replanted (GAO, 2000) , investment would probably be slowed or discontinued. There has been evidence that unprotected intellectual property rights produce underinvestment (Chin & Grossman, 1990 ).
Although there is no evidence of predatory monopolies at this time, farmers are going to have to learn to deal with noncompetitive markets upstream. In a global economy, technology is going to be a critical component of U.S. agricultural competitive advantage. Other countries have advantages in labor costs or government support-the United States has technology. Three responses may serve the U.S. farmer well. If farmers feel that market power is excessive among input suppliers, they can direct their cooperatives to invest in biotechnology research and development or seed production to offset any inequities. By increasing scale through organizational forms such as corporations, limited liability companies, or cooperatives, greater and more competitive access would be achieved to biotechnology inputs. Finally, the best way to thwart market power is to foster innovation. By supporting an active research and product development environment, agricultural producers can ensure a next generation of competitive technologies.
NOTES
"stacking" technologies and other developments will be developed to fight the insect resistance problem (Monsanto, 1998) .
15. The following draws on the discussions of Carlton and Perloff (1990, pp. 459-465) and Tirole (1992, pp. 143-145) .
16. Discount coupons for Disneyland are another way to charge discriminatory fixed fees. Those consumers who have the more elastic demands and lower willingness to pay derive a smaller amount of surplus from going to Disneyland. So by making the transaction costs high for obtaining a coupon, those consumers who will bear such costs are able to lower their entry fees and yet enjoy the low-cost rides. Those consumers who are, say, wealthier and whose demand is more inelastic, do not search out the coupons and pay the higher entry fee. Thus, the Disney monopolist is able to keep the lower demander coming to the park while extracting more of the elastic demander's surplus. This sort of discrimination can be done with a two-part as opposed to uniform pricing. This has been done in the seed market as well (see Fall 2000 Monsanto commercials concerning rebates). By offering programs with rebates or prizes but involving high transaction costs (i.e., forms or extensive usage documentation), the smaller farmer whose opportunity costs are generally lower partakes in the offer and receives the discount. The large farmer passes on the offer because the transaction costs are too high.
17. Monsanto's patent on Roundup® (glyphosate) will expire in late 2000 (Howie, 1999) . 18. For a further discussion of this topic, see Carlton and Perloff (1990, pp. 632-645) .
19. Especially at this early stage of the industry's evolution.
